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PRIVATE LAW
petition for damages was filed in the proceeding and was met
with an exception to the court's jurisdiction, which was main-
tained because of the previous final judgment. The petition, it
was argued, was a new suit for damages to which the state had
not consented. A second suit was also dismissed. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit rejected the plea to the jurisdiction, holding
failure to caption a pleading "supplemental" should not be fatal
to the court's jurisdiction to hear a later claim for damages re-
sulting from an expropriation;57 the constitutional provision
against taking or damaging "has long been held to permit re-
covery against the state, without the necessity of the state's con-
senting to suit, for damages resulting to property beyond that
actually expropriated." However, having found jurisdiction, it
sustained other exceptions and remanded the cases to permit
amendment of the pleadings; a cause of action for damages, if
it could be stated, would lie only against the United States under
the federal-state agreement which provides only for indemnifica-




From the many tort cases decided by the Louisiana appellate
courts during the past term, the writer has selected for discus-
sion a few which represent new interpretations of the law or
applications of recent tort theory, or which present an occasion
for discussing new trends in other jurisdictions.
Defamation of a Public Official
In March 1964 the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of New York Times v. Sullivan,1 holding that the first
amendment to the United States Constitution "prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves the statement
was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
57. Id. at 813.
58. Id. at 814.
*Research Assistant, Louisiana State University School of Law.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not.' 2 In so doing, the court elevated to constitutional status
the rule of a respectable minority of state jurisdictions which
allowed a qualified privilege for nonmalicious misstatement of
fact on matters of public interest.3 (The majority view granted
a qualified privilege only for "fair comment" on public matters,
and the facts had to be truthful.) 4 The minority rule, however,
had limited the privilege to statements made with an honest or
reasonable belief in their truth, while the Sullivan decision in-
troduced a new basis for determining liability - proof of actual
malice, as defined in the opinion, 5 and as further explained in
Garrison v. Louisiana.6 The Garrison case applied the Sullivan
rule to criminal libel and offered the Court another opportunity
for elaborating on its interpretation of "actual malice." The
opinion used such language as: "reasonoble-belief standard ...
is not the same as the reckless-disregard-of-truth standard,"
'7
"only those false statements made with the high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity .. .may be the subject of
either civil or criminal sanctions" ;8 and "erroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate."9
Last term the Supreme Court considered another libel suit,
Rosenblatt v. Baer,10 which was brought by the former manager
2. Id. at 279-80.
3. The leading case for the minority view is Coleman v. Maclennan, 78 Kan.
711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), which presented an extensive analysis of arguments
for and against liberalization of libel law concerning matters of public interest.
The minority view was enforced in approximately fifteen other states: Phoenix
Newspapers v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P.2d 150 (1957) ; Snively v. Record
Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City
Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955) ; Pearce v. Brower, 72 Ga. 243
(1884) ; Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W. 167 (1922) ; Gough v.
Tribune-Jouinal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 275 P.2d 663 (1954) ; Lawrence v. Fox, 357
Mich. 134, 97 N.W.2d 719 (1959); Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1,
277 N.W. 264 (1938); Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, 121 Atl. 92 (1923) ;
Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962); Jackson v. Pittsburgh
Times, 152 Pa. 406, 25 Atl. 613 (1893) ; Boucher v. Clark Publishing Co., 14
S.D. 72, 84 N.W. 237 (1900); Williams v. Standard Examiner Publishing Co.,
83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1 (1933) ; Posnett v. Marble, 62 Vt. 481, 20 Atl. 813 (1889)
Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W.Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943).
4. See PROSSER, TORTS 814 (3d ed. 1964).
5. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80.
6. 379 U.S. 64 (1964), holding the Louisiana criminal libel statute (R.S.
§ 14:47-49 (1950)) unconstitutional for two reasons: (1) it directs punishment
for true statements made with actual malice, when truth is an absolute defense
under the first amendment protection of free speech; (2) it punishes false state-
ments about public officials if not made in the reasonable belief of their truth,
thereby violating the "actual malice" standard established in the Sullivan case.
7. Id. at 79.
8. Id. at 74.
9. Ibid.
10. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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of a county-owned recreation area against a newspaper column-
ist. The case was remanded, among other reasons, to allow new
evidence as to whether the plaintiff was a "public official," with
guidelines for such determination prescribed by the Court." The
opinion said that whether one is a public official should not
be decided by state-law standards, and that the "designation
applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of govern-
ment employees who have, or appear to the public to have, sub-
stantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of govern-
mental affairs."'12
The unavoidable conflict raised by the law of libel between
two legal policies-protection of an individual's reputation and
the right of freedom of speech-is recognized by the Supreme
Court when it says, "Whatever is added to the field of libel is
taken from the field of free debate."' 3
The scope of the Sullivan rule and its effect on the law of
libel have been the subject of much legal writing,14 and the
courts are attempting to answer some of the questions left open:
(1) Who is a "public official" 15 and whether the decision also
11. Id. at 84.
12. Id. at 85.
13. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964), quoting Sweeney
v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942). In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,
86 (1966), the Court states it even more explicitly: "Society has a pervasive
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation. But
in cases like the present, there is tension between this interest and the values
nurtured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The thrust of New York
Times is that when interests in public discussion are particularly strong, as they
were in that case, the Constitution limits the protections afforded by the law of
defamation."
14. Bertelsman, Libel and Public Men, 52 A.B.A.J. 675 (1966); Constitu-
tional Aspects of Libel or Slander of Officials, Annot., 95 A.L.R. 2d 1450 (1964) ;
Comment, Defamation of a Public Official: The New York Times Case in Per-
spective, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 376 (1966); Brennan, The Supreme Court and
the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1(1966) ; Comment, Defamation a Deux: Incidental Defamation and the Sullivan
Doctrine, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 241 (1966) ; Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV.
191; Note, Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional Limitations on State
Defamation Laws, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (1965) ; Berney, Libel and the First
Amendment -A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 1 (1965);
Comment, The Scope of the First Amendment Protection for Good-Faith Defama-
tory Error, 75 Yale L.J. 642 (1964).
15. Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965) (city deputy-chief of
detectives) ; Prosel v. Myers Publishing Co., 48 Ill. App.2d 402, 199 N.E.2d 73(1964) (president of an Illinois village) ; Matassa v. Bel, 246 La. 294, 164 So. 2d
332 (1964) (candidate for office of constable who was former manager of city
airport) ; Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W. 2d 112 (Ky. 1964) (police patrolman) ;
Nusbaum v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 86 N.J. Super. 132, 206 A.2d 185(App. Div. 1965) (former member of Board of Education) ; Gilligan v. King,
48 Misc.2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (policeman) ; Fegley v. Mor-
thimer, 204 Pa. Super. 54, 202 A.2d 125 (1964) (school board member). See
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applies to the "public man"? 16 (2) What constitutes "actual
malice"? 17 (3) How the protection of the first amendment
affects other categories of speech, e.g., obscenity? 8 (4) Whether
the qualified privilege also immunizes defamation of a private
party that is involved with or incidental to the defamation of
a public official? 19
these two Supreme Court decisions post-dating Sullivan: Henry v. Collins, 380
U.S. 356 (1965) (chief of police, an appointed officer, held to be a public of-
ficial) ; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), discussed in text supra.
16. Butts v. Curtis Pub. Co., 242 F.Supp. 390 (N.D. Ga. 1964), aff'd 351
F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 19651, lower court held Director of Athletics and football
coach at state university not a public official; appellate court affirmed, but held
that issue not before it; dissenting opinion would apply Sullivan rule; Pauling
v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968
(1965), involved participant in public debate on an issue of grave public concern;
Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F.Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky.
1965), former major general and person of political prominence; Parson v. Fair-
banks Pub. Co., 33 U.S.L. Week 2307 (unreported, Superior Ct. of Alaska, 4th
Dist., Nov. 25, 1964) (nationally-known columnist occupies same standing as
senatorial candidate he publicly supported) ; Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, Inc.,
65 Ill. App.2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1 (1965) (rule extended to prominent socialite);
Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1964), aff'd, 254
N.Y.S.2d 80 (1964) (published "public affairs of a public hero") ; Faulk v.
Aware, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372, 253 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 916 (1965) (radio and television personality) ; Spahn v. Julian
Messner, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d '529 (Sup. Ct. 1964), ajf'd, 260
N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965) (major league baseball pitcher - invasion of privacy suit) ;
Harper v. National Review, Inc., 33 U.S.L. Week 2341 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 22,
1964) (private individual involved in a public debate); Associated Press v.
Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (no mention of Sullivan case,
but protection by 1st and 14th amendments denied in suit brought by former
general). See also Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53
(1966) ; Meyer v. Joint Council 53, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 416 Pa. 401,
206 A.2d 382 (1965), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 897 (1965), concerning juris-
dictional problems arising out of libel suits involving participants in labor dis-
putes.
17. Further definitioxn is supplied by the Court in Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S.
356 (1965), where no actual malice was found from a "showing of intent to in-
flict harm, rather than an intent to inflict harm through falsehood."
See Butts v. Curtis Pub. Co., 242 F.Supp. 390 (N.D. Ga. 1964), aff'd, 351
F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965), plaintiff was not held to be a public official, but both
courts stated evidence would justify a finding of reckless disregard; Walker v.
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F.Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965), re-
liance upon national news gathering agencies insufficient to establish reckless
disregard; Keogh v. Pearson, 244 F.Supp. 482 (D. D.C. 1965) ; State v. Browne,
86 N.J. Super. 217, 206 A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1965) ; Note, Recent Developments
Concerning Constitutional Limitations on State Defamation Laws, 18 VAND. L.
REv. 1429 (1965), which considers whether "reckless disregard" is closely analo-
gous to concept of "gross negligence."
18. Previously, the "redeeming social value" test has usually been employed
to inhibit obscenity; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpre-
tation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1966) ; Kalven, The New
York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191.
19. Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), aff'd,
mem., 15 N.Y.S.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 610, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965), law partner
of mayor precluded from recovering from aldermanic candidate who made state-
ments about mayor's law firm; Comment, Defamation a Deux: Incidental Defama-
tion and the Sullivan Doctrine, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 241 (1966).
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Last term the Louisiana appellate court was confronted with
a case requiring application of the Sullivan rule. During the
1962 campaign for United States Senator, one of the candidates
as part of a television appearance read an affidavit that made
broad accusations about Mr. E. G. Partin, a local official of the
Teamsters Union. The candidate then sought to show a political
connection between his opponent, Senator Russell Long, and the
union official-all of which was given wide publicity by the
press.
In discussing Mr. Partin's activities, the affidavit also men-
tioned one Herman Thompson, a deputy sheriff, who sued the
candidate for libel and slander. The gist of the allegedly libelous
portion of the affidavit was that Partin and others were going
to steal the union's safe to avoid having documents in it made
subject to an investigation, and that affiant and others were
hoping to prevent the theft. The affidavit continued, "Imagine
our predicament knowing of Ed's connection with the sheriff's
office through Herman Thompson who made recent visits to the
hall to see Ed. We also knew of money that had passed hands
between Ed and Herman Thompson, from Ed to Herman."'2 1
The trial court considered plaintiff a public official, citing
Louisiana statutes, cases, and the Constitution to support its
definition,22 but defendant was held to have acted with reckless
disregard of whether his statements were true.23 The appellate
court affirmed the holding on the public-official question and
also held that the statements spoke of plaintiff in his official
capacity, since the affidavit dealt "with the fears of the affiant
concerning the manner in which the plaintiff would or would
not discharge his duties if the mentioned safe was stolen." 24
The court rejected plaintiff's contention that his conduct was un-
official, that is, soliciting funds for charitable organizations,
25
properly holding that this was not the conduct criticized.
A more difficult issue for the appellate court was whether
the candidate's statements were made within the "reckless dis-
regard" concept. Defendant testified that plaintiff was not in
20. Thompson v. St. Amant, 184 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
21. Id. at 316.
22. Id. at 320.
23. Id. at 321.
24. Id. at 322.
25. Evidence was given that part of plaintiff's duties was participating in
various fund-raising drives, so the action described could have been considered
"official conduct" from either position.
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his thoughts when he read the affidavit; that he did not consider
plaintiff would be harmed thereby; that he would "let the public
draw the conclusion that they might from the remark." The
court found the facts surrounding the disputed exchange of
money such as could have made a union member suspicious of the
relationship, and concluded that "the use of the quoted statement
could not be said to have been used with reckless disregard as to
whether false or true." The court apparently did not consider
the point raised by the affidavit: Is one who relies on a sworn
statement less likely to be guilty of a "reckless disregard" than
one who relies on a signed letter or on the mere reputation of
the transmitter of information? This case seems to be the first
application of the Sullivan rule involving reliance on an affidavit.
Another point should be raised. This case illustrates libel
arising from what could be called a "side-angle" attack. (It has
been previously mentioned as incidental defamation ;26 defendant
directs his words at one person, incidentally defaming another.)
In one case, the language was primarily directed at a public
official, incidentally referring to his law partner.27 In the
Thompson case, the defendant apparently meant to report on the
activities of a private person, and by inference to attack his
opponent-a public official. Incidentally, in so doing, he was
alleged to have defamed another public official-the plaintiff.
Many more cases will have to be decided before the final delinea-
tion of the Sullivan rule is achieved. Since the foregoing com-
ments were written, the Court of Appeal's decision in Thompson
v. St. Amant has been reversed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decision will be discussed in the next annual
symposium appearing in this Review.
DUTY TO TRESPASSING CHILDREN - ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
In the last installment of this symposium, there is a thorough
explanation of the evolution of the law concerning trespassing
children and of the modern trend abandoning the so-called
"attractive nuisance" doctrine in favor of a special duty of care
owed to young trespassers. 28 Louisiana, in Stanley v. Missouri
26. See note 20 supra.
27. Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), aff'd,
meme., 15 N.Y.S.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 620, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965).
28. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-65 Term-
Torts, 26 LA. L. REV. 510, 524 (1966). A lengthy discussion of the trend is found
in Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427 (1959).
[Vol. XXVII
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Pac. R.R., 29 has joined the trend. In an opinion affirming a dis-
missal for no cause of action where a six-year-old boy was in-
jured by a fall from the ladder of a freight car, the court said
it was referring to the "so-called attractive nuisance doctrine for
the sake of convenience, since the appeal was briefed with ref-
erence to such nomenclature," but it recognized that the "basis
of liability is neither 'nuisance' nor an 'attraction', but simply
negligence, i.e., the maintenance on the premises of a foreseeable
and unreasonable hazard to children whose presence should be
anticipated."
In another case, Frensley v. Gravity Drainage District No. 5,-"
the court continued to refer to the attractive nuisance doctrine,
but, in making its decision, it relied on the factors listed in section
33, Restatement, Torts, 2d, which outlines the theory previously
referred to. The Frensley case involved the drowning of a six-
year-old boy in a drainage ditch which was part of the drainage
system for the entire community, and the court necessarily held
the utility of the canal outweighed the danger to children. Three
other cases involving trespassing children, but not decided under




Implied Warranty for Wholesomeness of Food
In Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 32 plaintiff broke her
denture by chewing on a cherry pit contained in a slice of cherry
pie purchased from defendant's cafeteria. Recognizing that past
Louisiana decisions impose an implied warranty of wholesome-
ness upon the server of foods, the court nevertheless held this
piece of pie was fit for human consumption because the cherry
pit was "natural" to the ingredients in the pie. Having thus
denied liability on the basis of implied warranty, the court pro-
ceeded to hold that the defendant was not negligent in the man-
ner in which it inspected the cherries for pits, applying as its
standard of care that which a "reasonably prudent man skilled
29. 179 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
30. 180 So. 2d 743 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
31. Wannage v. Marcantel, 176 So. 2d 5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; Lafont v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 182 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) ; Louviere v. Great
Am. Corp., 183 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
32. 178 So.2d 421 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965). Note that action was dismissed
as to the packer and distributor of the cherries.
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in the culinary art would exercise in the selection and prepara-
tion of food for his own table. '33
There are a number of cases holding there is no breach of
the implied warranty of wholesomeness where food substances
constituting a natural part of the ingredients or finished product
are left in food served to patrons, but a reasonable expectation
theory should be applied in all such decisions. If the foreign
matter is not usually found in the item served, and the consumer
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate the object, then an
injury resulting therefrom should be actionable.34 Thus, a rea-
sonable expectation test would demonstrate that one should be
on guard against fish bones when served whole fish, but it is
doubtful if a customer expects to find a chicken bone in chicken
soup or a cherry pit in cherry pie.
Defective Product Due to Negligent Assembling
One case before the appellate court this past term involved
the type of product liability problem that is evoking a change
in the law in many jurisdictions.3 5 The suit was brought against
the manufacturer of a dressing table stool, the retailer-assembler,
and the motel-purchaser for injuries sustained when a guest at
the motel was injured by the collapse of the stool on which she
was standing. Apparently the suit was tried on a negligence
basis, with no claim being made under implied warranty or
strict liability. The manufacturer offered evidence of tests
made on similar stools and was released from liability on the
grounds that the stool's collapse could not be attributed to im-
proper manufacture or design, and that the stool would fail only
if improperly assembled. The retailer was held liable, appar-
ently for negligent assembly of the product, and the motel was
liable for failure to discover the defect; the defense of abnormal
use of the stool by standing thereon was rejected.
In a recent issue of this Review, there is a discussion of the
emerging strict liability doctrine in product liability cases, 36 and
the legal periodicals are replete with articles on the subject.37
33. Id. at 427.
34. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 809 (1966).
35. Nettles v. Forbes Motel, Inc., 182 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
36. Note, The Emergence of Strict Liability in Products Cases, 26 LA. L. REv.
447 (1966).
37. For an excellent discussion of the history and evolution of the doctrine,
see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791 (1966).
(Vol. XXVII
PRIVATE LAW
Before a suit such as this could be decided under this evolving
theory, certain issues must be determined: (1) Should the case
be tried on the basis of negligence, implied warranty, or strict
liability in tort? (2) Where should the responsibility for the risk
be placed-on the manufacturer who can insure against the risk
and include the cost thereof in his purchase price, or on the con-
sumer? (3) When is a product considered "defective"-when it
leaves the manufacturer or when it is delivered to the consumer?
In the Nettles case just discussed, other questions arise con-
cerning the manufacturer's delegation of responsibility in ship-
ping an unassembled product, knowing that if it is improperly
assembled, it may be dangerous: Are we going to put the re-
sponsibility on every manufacturer who ships an unassembled
product for injury caused by faulty assembly? Does it matter
if the product is difficult or simple to assemble? What if the
manufacturer omits certain screws from the package that are
necessary to assemble the product? In today's business world,
it seems the manufacturer must be able to rely on the middleman.
However, the trend is toward strict liability in tort for an article
which the manufacturer places on the market, and he cannot
escape liability by tracing the defect to a part of the manufac-
turing or assembling process which he delegated to a third
person. It remains to be seen when, or if, Louisiana will apply
strict liability in this type of products case.38
LIABILITY OF BUILDING OWNER
Defective Equipment in Leased Premises
The absolute liability of the building owner in Louisiana to
guests of his tenant for injuries sustained because of defects in
the premises is based upon the provisions of Louisiana Civil
Code article 2322. In Fontenot v. Sarver 9 the court held that
an unguarded window fan is a vice or defect within the mean-
ing of the article and allowed recovery for damages arising from
amputation by the fan of a two-year-old child's finger. The fan
was found to be in place when the house was rented, though
defendant denied ownership of the fan or knowledge of its in-
stallation in the house. The court's extension of the owner's
38. See Note, 26 LA. L. REv. 447 (1966), for discussion of application of the
doctrine in food and beverage cases and in actions involving products intended for
intimate bodily use.
39. 183 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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liability to a defective piece of equipment installed in the build-
ing prior to the tenant's taking possession seems logical and
correct.
Glass Doors
With the prevalence in contemporary architecture of glass
panels and glass doors, many courts are having to decide the
question of liability from injury caused by a person's walking
into the glass. 40 Two divergent theories are found in the deci-
sions: (1) recovery is denied on the basis of lack of negligence,
or no breach of duty, on the part of the building owner; or (2)
the building owner is held responsible under what has been called
an "illusion of space" theory.4 ' Some jurisdictions have distin-
guished the duty owed to a child from that owed to an adult,
holding the glass could constitute a physical hazard to the child.42
In the first "glass door" case reported in this state, the court
took the position that the building owner, a church, was not
negligent in having a glass door, unmarked by decals or some
other design, even though the particular building was frequently
used as a gathering place for children. 43 The decision also held
the church had no duty to give warnings about the glass door to
persons using the building as the door was not a trap or a hidden
danger.
Variations in the "glass door" case are illustrated by the
situation where a construction worker is not warned that the
glass sections of a partially constructed building have been in-
stalled 4 and by the breaking or shattering of a glass door or
panel, not due to plaintiff's mistaken attempt to walk through
the glass. 45
40. Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1204 (1959).
41. National Bank of Alaska v. McHugh, 416 P.2d 239 (Alaska, 1966)
Personal Injury: Actions, Defenses, Damages, Building, § 3.06[6] (Matthew
Bender & Co.).
42. McCain v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 110 So. 2d 718 (Fla. App. 1959)
Waugh v. Duke Corp., 248 F.Supp. 626 (M.D. N.C. 1966).
43. Sullivan v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. of Pa., 185 So. 2d 336 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1966).
44. Fisher Constr. Co. v. Riggs, 320 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
45. See Appleman, Plate Glass Door Cases; Liability of Contractor After
Work Completed and Accepted, in 1959 TRIAL AND TORT TRENDs 32.
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SPECTATOR INJURED AT FOOTBALL GAME
An example of the injured-spectator-at-sporting-event cases is
afforded in Turner v. Caddo Parish School Board.46 A seventy-
one year old grandmother of a junior high football player attend-
ed a regularly scheduled game to watch her grandson play. It was
the first football game she had ever attended. No accommoda-
tions were provided for the 1,500-2,000 spectators, no playing
areas restricted or delineated, nor was any attempt made to con-
trol the crowd. During the game, a play was run out of bounds
of the playing field, the spectators in front of plaintiff moved
aside, and she was knocked down by the players, receiving in-
juries. The court reversed a judgment sustaining defendant's
exception of no cause and no right of action, remanding the case
for trial.
After determining that plaintiff was at least an implied in-
vitee, the court considered the question of defendant's negligence
and its argument that it had no obligation to "rope off spectator
areas." The court traced the history of injured spectators as
it began in the baseball cases and developed in suits involving
injuries at hockey games, wrestling matches and even soap-box
derbies. In this type of action, the real issue for determination
is the extent of defendant's duty: Would further efforts by the
management to minimize the peril be impossible or imprac-
ticable ?4 In the baseball cases, it is not reasonable to expect
the management to completely screen the stands and bleachers,
nor would the public be willing to view the game in this re-
stricted manner; therefore a defendant is not negligent when
a spectator sitting in an open area is injured by a batted ball.
The defendant in this case, however, was apparently guilty of
actionable negligence in failing to make provision for spectator
accommodations or to provide safeguards for the crowd. The
court was obviously influenced by the duty owed by the defend-
ant, but its discussion of the rationale of assumption of risk
interjects an element of confusion.48
46. 179 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
47. Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L.
REV. 61 (1945).
48. For a multi-faceted discussion of the rationale, see Symposium: Assump-
tion of Risk, 22 LA. L. REV. 1 (1961).
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